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REASSOCIATING STUDENT RIGHTS: GIVING
IT THE OLE COLLEGE TRY
Tyler Mlakar*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of 2020, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) declared Coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) a
“public health emergency of international concern.”1
Governments around the world began instituting citywide and
even nationwide “lockdowns.”2 In the United States, the
approach was far more splintered. While there was no nationwide
lockdown, states across the country instituted varying measures
ranging from “shelter-in-place” and “stay at home” orders, to
school closures, limits on the size of public gatherings, “mask
mandates,” and even some states allowing restaurants and bars to

*
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1. WHO Director-General’s Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel
Coronavirus
(2019-nCoV),
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(Jan.
30,
2020),
[https://perma.cc/A2WW-MCQZ].
2. See, e.g., Coronavirus: India Enters ‘Total Lockdown’ After Spike in Cases, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 25, 2020), [https://perma.cc/QDS6-MTDN]; Michael Levenson, Scale of
China’s Wuhan Shutdown Is Believed to Be Without Precedent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/42W6-R32W]; Emmanuel Macron annonce l’interdiction des
déplacements non essentiels dès mardi midi, MAG. MARIANNE (Mar. 17, 2020, 8:10 AM),
[https://perma.cc/PM2V-X3XU]; Eric Sylvers & Giovanni Legorano, As Virus Spreads,
Italy Locks Down Country, WALL ST. J., [https://perma.cc/HA3T-FWD2] (Mar. 9, 2020,
6:42 PM); Ndanki Kahiurika, Countdown to Lockdown, NAMIBIAN (Mar. 27, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/S2EJ-NRL4]; Calla Wahlquist, Australia’s Coronavirus Lockdown—The
First 50 Days, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2020, 4:00 PM), [https://perma.cc/PGK9-255K].
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remain open.3 Across the United States, these measures have
resulted in the most pervasive governmental regulation of
American citizens’ private affairs since World War II.4
During the early stages of COVID-19, universities
nationwide frantically closed their doors to students and
scrambled to adopt online teaching curricula.5 As COVID-19
restrictions began to relax across the country over the summer
months, many universities decided to reopen their campuses for
the fall 2020 semester.6 To the seeming astonishment of
university administrators, upon returning to campus, young,
impressionable students who had not seen their friends in months
decided they did not want to sit in their dorm rooms all day every
day.7 As COVID-19 cases surged on campus, universities
adopted policies—often incorporated into their disciplinary
codes—designed to curb the spread of the virus, including, among
other things: mask mandates, required completion of “daily
3. James G. Hodge, Jr., COVID-19 Emergency Legal Preparedness Primer, NETWORK
FOR PUB. HEALTH L. (Mar. 24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/LF5X-EWBE]; Lawrence Gostin &
Sarah Wetter, Why There’s No National Lockdown, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/AZ6U-GVM3]; Gov. Northam Announces Statewide Mask Mandate to
Begin Friday, NBC12 NEWSROOM, [https://perma.cc/FB72-D9AP] (May 27, 2020, 6:37
AM); Josh Shannon, Face Mask Mandate Takes Effect in Delaware, NEWARK POST (Apr.
29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6KJN-3N6K].
4. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the
authority of the executive to force American citizens of Japanese descent to evacuate their
homes and relocate to government internment camps).
5. Mike Baker et al., First U.S. Colleges Close Classrooms as Virus Spreads. More
Could Follow, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/9DMN-D45W] (Mar. 11, 2020); Abigail
Johnson Hess, How Coronavirus Dramatically Changed College for Over 14 Million
Students, CNBC (Mar. 26, 2020, 2:07 PM), [https://perma.cc/S58Y-5JMR] (stating that as
of March 26, 2020, more than 1,100 colleges and universities had closed their doors to
students as a result of COVID-19).
6. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Fever Checks and Quarantine Dorms: The Fall
College Experience?, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/JZ4V-F8P8] (Aug. 18, 2020); Elinor
Aspegren & Samuel Zwickel, In Person, Online Classes or a Mix: Colleges’ Fall 2020
Coronavirus Reopening Plans, Detailed, USA TODAY (June 22, 2020, 5:36 PM),
[https://perma.cc/7N27-7ZC8]; Jacquelyn Elias et al., Here’s Our List of Colleges’
Reopening Models, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., [https://perma.cc/9WBA-SJKL] (Oct. 1, 2020,
2:04 PM) (providing the fall 2020 reopening plans of nearly 3,000 colleges and universities).
7. See, e.g., Scottie Andrew, The Psychology Behind Why Some College Students
Break Covid-19 Rules, CNN, [https://perma.cc/SSB4-5KTY] (Sept. 9, 2020, 12:37 PM);
More Suspensions Possible as NYU Investigates Massive Party in Washington Square Park,
NBC N.Y., [https://perma.cc/AFX2-34WC] (Sept. 7, 2020, 12:43 PM); Natasha Singer,
College Quarantine Breakdowns Leave Some at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/RC3HNNDD] (Sept. 16, 2020) (detailing how many students refused to remain in quarantine).
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health checks,” prohibitions of in-person registered student
organization (“RSO”) meetings, limits on the size of student
gatherings on and off campus, reporting measures for student
violations, virus tracking apps, etc.8
Unfortunately, for many students, it did not take long for
them to discover that these policies were not idle threats;
disciplinary action was swift and relentless, often making national
headlines.9 The obvious question for many students and their
8. See, e.g., E-mail from Charles F. Robinson, Interim Provost, Univ. of Ark., to Univ.
of Ark. Cmty. (Sept. 4, 2020, 12:50 PM CST) [hereinafter Appendix A] (appended below);
UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, COVID-19 POLICY (2021), [https://perma.cc/S39U-V6GP];
COVID-19: Essential Information, MIDDLEBURY COLL., [https://perma.cc/C92L-FJVS]
(last visited Oct. 19, 2021); UC Berkeley Keep Berkeley Healthy Pledge, UC BERKELEY,
[https://perma.cc/WV7B-LBP8] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021); Rebecca Blank, Chancellor
Directs 14-Day Student Restrictions for Health, Safety, UNIV. OF WIS.-MADISON (Sept. 7,
2020), [https://perma.cc/W5A4-5Z7Y]; Policy on Health Requirements Related to COVID19 Pandemic, NYU (Aug. 27, 2021), [https://perma.cc/6KLD-3BEZ]; Protect Texas
Together, UNIV. OF TEX., [https://perma.cc/M28K-W8DQ] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021);
Healthy
Together
Community
Commitment
Violations,
WM. & MARY,
[https://perma.cc/49KQ-V62L] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021). Indeed, the interim dean of
students of Northwestern University requested that even non-university-affiliated residents
of the communities surrounding Northwestern report student violations of COVID-19
policies off campus to university administrators. Elyssa Cherney, ‘There’s Been an Awful
Lot of Partying’: Northwestern University Asks Evanston Residents to Report Students Who
Ignore COVID-19 Precautions in Off-Campus Gatherings, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/EY4G-E9HK].
9. See, e.g., Bobby Maldonado & Marianne Thomson, Additional Information About
Last Night’s Quad Gathering, SYRACUSE UNIV. (Aug. 20, 2020), [https://perma.cc/77QCCS8E] (suspending twenty-three students for gathering with scores of others in the university
quad); Ian Thomsen, Northeastern Dismisses 11 Students for Gathering in Violation of
COVID-19 Policies, NEWS@NE (Sept. 4, 2020), [https://perma.cc/243M-H9MT]
(dismissing eleven students from Northeastern for congregating in a hotel room in violation
of Northeastern’s COVID-19 conduct policies); Riddhi Andurkar, UPDATE: Two MU
Students Expelled, Three Suspended for COVID-19 Safety Violations, COLUM. MISSOURIAN
(Sept. 15, 2020), [https://perma.cc/895P-87KH] (discussing how the University of Missouri
expelled two students, suspended three others, and began an investigation of eleven student
organizations as a result of reported violations of the university’s COVID-19 policies); Annie
Grayer, 36 Purdue Students Suspended After Breaking Social Distancing Rules, CNN (Aug.
21, 2020, 3:32 PM), [https://perma.cc/7P4B-J6GS] (reporting on Purdue University
administrators’ decision to suspend thirty-six students for attending a party off campus and
not following the university’s COVID-19 policies); Rachel Treisman, More Than 200 Ohio
State University Students Suspended for Violating Pandemic Rules, NPR (Aug. 25, 2020,
9:17 PM), [https://perma.cc/UA4H-H37A] (reporting on Ohio State University
administrators’ decision to temporarily suspend 228 students before classes even began as a
result of the students’ violations of the University’s COVID-19 safety protocols); Pi Kappa
Alpha Chapter and Its Leaders Receive Summary Suspensions, PENNSTATE,
[https://perma.cc/7ZCK-V6LV] (Sept. 22, 2020) (suspending a fraternity and members of its
executive board for hosting a gathering with approximately seventy people in attendance);
Elissa Nadworny, Despite Mass Testing, University of Illinois Sees Coronavirus Cases Rise,
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parents thus became, can public10 universities do this in light of
the United States Constitution’s guarantee of the First
Amendment right to freely associate?11 Not much controversy
surrounded administrators’ decisions to discipline students for
on-campus violations of COVID-19 policies, but the discipline of
students for their off-campus behavior left many enraged and
none with answers. This is largely because the Supreme Court
has never addressed the extent to which public universities may
regulate the off-campus associational activities of their students.
Indeed, the Court has barely touched the First Amendment right
to association in the university context at all, even on campus.12
The jurisprudence of university students’ associational
rights, like that of its speech counterpart, may aptly be described
as “a mixture of muddled reasoning and inconsistent decisions,”13
so muddled, in fact, “that even ‘lawyers, law professors, and
judges’ are unclear what standards apply.”14 As the law currently
stands, there is no one clear approach that courts may uniformly
apply to review the constitutionality of university regulations of
students’ associational rights. Although there is a robust body of
scholarship regarding the impacts of university restrictions on
First Amendment rights, particularly speech, to date, no scholar
has attempted to unravel the extraordinarily murky patchwork of
case law to identify a clear approach to the student associational
NPR (Sept. 3, 2020, 10:39 AM), [https://perma.cc/BA9Y-SJXG] (stating that as of
September 3, 2020, about 100 students and organizations were facing disciplinary action—
including suspension—for violating the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s
COVID-19 policies).
10. Because the Constitution requires state action before its provisions are applicable,
I will not address private universities throughout the rest of this Comment. See generally
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). However, it is likely that even most private
universities today are subject to the directives of the Constitution given their continuous
reception of massive amounts of federal funding. See Richard Vedder, There Are Really
Almost No Truly Private Universities, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM),
[https://perma.cc/UV8X-YVGC]. I will leave this question for another day.
11. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) (“A
state university without question is a state actor.”).
12. See infra Section II.B.2.b.
13. Frank D. LoMonte, “The Key Word is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship Crashes
the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 341 (2013).
14. Meggen Lindsay, Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-Speech
Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—Tatro v. University of Minnesota,
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1470, 1500 (2012) (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334,
353 (2d Cir. 2011)).
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rights analysis. In light of the critical gap in the Court’s
associational rights jurisprudence, this Comment proposes a
three-tiered, sliding scale of judicial scrutiny analytical
framework for reviewing the constitutionality of university
regulation of students’ associational rights.
In the first tier, the university is at the height of its authority
to regulate students’ associational rights. When the targeted
activity is on campus and school sponsored,15 the courts should
review a university’s regulations of its students’ associational
activities under the rational basis test. In the second tier, the
university retains a significant amount of authority to regulate
associational activities that are either off campus and school
sponsored or on campus and not school sponsored. The courts
should review university regulations of students’ associational
activities that fall into this second tier under the intermediate
scrutiny test. Finally, in the last tier, the university’s authority to
regulate is at its trough where the regulation impacts off-campus,
non-school-sponsored associational activities.
University
attempts to regulate associational activities that fall into this third
tier should be reviewed under the strict scrutiny test.
Importantly, the three tiers are not rigid, unforgiving
concepts, but rather, they are meant to be guideposts for the Court
along a sliding scale of judicial scrutiny. Indeed, I realize, as
often happens in the law, there exist gray areas in which student
conduct does not neatly fit into any one of the three tiers. A
flexible approach such as this one would allow the Court to
consider the idiosyncrasies of each case while also providing
clear guidance to university administrators and lower courts.
This Comment will proceed as follows. In Part II, I will
discuss the various (and often inconsistent) frameworks that
courts currently apply to university students’ associational rights.
Part III subsequently re-introduces the proposed three-tiered
15. For the purposes of this Comment, I use the definition of “school-sponsored”
expounded by the Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 484 U.S. 260, 271
(1988) (explaining that “school-sponsored” means those “activities that students, parents,
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”).
Importantly, the Court has emphasized that even “high school students can appreciate the
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally
required to do so.” Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006).
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framework and justifies its adoption as the test the Court should
employ moving forward. Following this section, in Part IV, I will
use the proposed framework to review the constitutionality of the
University of Arkansas’s COVID-19 policy. Finally, in Part V, I
will call upon the Court to remedy the incoherent and unworkable
state of university student associational rights jurisprudence and
urge it to adopt a clear framework moving forward.
II. BACKGROUND
The Court’s university student associational rights
jurisprudence is nearly incomprehensible. To fully appreciate the
lack of a coherent approach, it is necessary to understand how the
Court got to where it is today. University student associational
rights principles draw from the right to association and primary
and secondary speech precedent. In this section, I will analyze
each of these predecessors in turn and explain the current state of
university student associational rights.
A. The Right to Association
The right to association is not express in either the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights.16 Nonetheless, since the
founding era, it has long been recognized as vital to both the
effective functioning of the United States government and the
preservation of individual liberties.17 Despite the founders’
16. U.S. CONST. amend I; Mark D. Bauer, Freedom of Association for College
Fraternities After Christian Legal Society and Citizens United, 39 J. COLL. & U. L. 247, 248
(2013).
17. Bauer, supra note 16, at 272 (discussing James Madison’s proposal that “[t]he
people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common
good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of their
grievances,” as well as The Federalist’s assertion that the freedom of association is necessary
to the proper functioning of a republic) (quoting THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 217 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (asserting that “[t]hose
who won our independence believed that . . . without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine[,]” and “they amended the Constitution so that free speech
and assembly should be guaranteed.”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)
(“Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to
engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First
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insistence on the fundamentality of the right to association, the
Supreme Court did not recognize the right as protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution until 1958.18
In the landmark case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the
Court highlighted the “close nexus” between the freedoms of
speech and association, emphasizing that one cannot exist without
the other.19 Furthermore, the Court unequivocally asserted that
the right to association is entitled to the most onerous of
constitutional protections in holding that “it is immaterial whether
the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters . . . state action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate
is subject to the closest scrutiny.”20 The right to association
remained a bulwark against government regulation for decades as
the Court continually reaffirmed its importance and occasionally
even expanded it.21
However, the right began to deteriorate in response to the
civil rights era and the general push for equality in the United
States throughout the 1960s-80s, as private groups throughout
this period continually tried to keep racial minorities and women
out of their organizations by asserting right to association claims,
only to have the courts consistently invalidate them.22 This
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.”). The freedom of association is deeply rooted in human
history. However, for the purposes of this Comment, I will only discuss the United States
constitutional beginnings of the right to association. For a more in-depth historical analysis
of the right, see generally CHARLES E. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962).
18. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); Scott Patrick
McBride, Freedom of Association in the Public University Setting: How Broad Is the Right
to Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 136 (1997).
19. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
20. Id. at 460-61 (emphasis added).
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (asserting that “[t]he right of
‘association,’ like the right of belief . . . is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes
the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation
with it or by other lawful means[,]” and that “[a]ssociation in that context is a form of
expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its
existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.”); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 624 (1980) (stating that
“[b]efore Griswold was decided, the notion of constitutional protection of the freedom of
association was a First Amendment doctrine and little more.”); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 447, 453 (1972) (extending Griswold).
22. See, e.g., Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515, 52427 (D. Colo. 1966).
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culminated in the Supreme Court’s overhauling of the right to
association in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.23 In Roberts, the
United States Jaycees (“Jaycees”), a non-profit membership
corporation dedicated to the growth and fostering of young men’s
civic organizations, brought an action against the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights (“MDHR”), claiming that the
MDHR’s demand that it admit women as regular members to its
organization violated its constitutional right to association.24 The
Court began its analysis of the Jaycees’ right to association claim
by breaking the right down into two sub-rights: the right to
intimate association and the right to expressive association.25
First, the Court discussed the right to intimate association.26
This right is protected “as a fundamental element of personal
liberty.”27 Indeed, the right “reflects the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close
ties with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted
state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently
to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”28
The Court went on to explain that this right is designed to protect
the formation of only certain kinds of highly personal
relationships and provided some guidance on how to interpret this
limitation.29
The “highly personal relationships” limitation requires that
the relationship in question contain those “personal bonds [which]
have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the
Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and

23. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
24. Id. at 612-13, 615.
25. Id. at 617-18 (stating that “[o]ur decisions have referred to constitutionally
protected ‘freedom of association’ in two distinct senses.”). However, the Court made sure
to clarify that these two rights are not always mutually exclusive, rather, in most instances
“freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated.” Id. at 618. But see, John
D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV.
149, 155-56 (2010) (arguing that the Roberts opinion “suggest[s] four possible categories of
associations: (1) intimate expressive associations, (2) intimate nonexpressive associations,
(3) nonintimate expressive associations, and (4) nonintimate nonexpressive associations.”).
26. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
27. Id. at 618.
28. Id. at 619.
29. Id. at 618-20.
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beliefs[.]”30 In other words, it must be along the lines of a familial
relationship.31 The Court ultimately established a spectrum
framework, where the State’s authority to regulate is contingent
upon how intimate the association is.32 The more intimate the
association, the more significant the State’s interest must be for it
to regulate that association.33 In providing further guidance on
gauging the placement of a given association along this spectrum,
the Court suggested several factors be taken into consideration:
size, selectivity, purpose, and seclusion.34 Using these factors,
the Court ultimately decided that the Jaycees were not entitled to
protection under the right to intimate association because the
chapters were not small or selective, and many women and other
non-members regularly attended meetings and participated in
social functions.35
Second, the Court discussed the right to expressive
association.36 The right to expressive association is the “right to
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected
by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”37 Expressive
association is thus a correlative right of sorts. In establishing this
right as distinct from the right to intimate association, the Court
reasoned that “[a]ccording protection to collective effort on
30. Id. at 618-19.
31. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (asserting that “[t]he personal affiliations that exemplify
these considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships
that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation
and sustenance of a family”).
32. Id. at 620; McBride, supra note 18, at 146 (“The continuum of groups for intimate
association analysis has at one end the family, possessing the most highly protected intimate
relationships, and at the other end a large, profit-motivated corporation, having no chance of
claiming intimate associational rights.”).
33. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (“Determining the limits of state authority over an
individual’s freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a
careful assessment of where that relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.”).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 621.
36. Id. at 621-22.
37. Id. at 618. The establishment of the right to expressive association is a recognition
of the fact that “[a]n individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference
by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were
not also guaranteed.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
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behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority.”38
While
recognizing that the right to expressive association is indeed
entitled to the most onerous of constitutional protections, the
Court held that it is not absolute, and that “[i]nfringements on that
right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.”39 In other words, government regulation
of expressive association must generally meet the arduous
demands of the strict scrutiny test in order to comport with the
Constitution.
While the MDHR’s demand that the Jaycees admit women
to the organization infringed upon the group’s right to expressive
association,40 the State of Minnesota nonetheless prevailed.41 The
Court reasoned that because (1) Minnesota had a compelling
interest in eradicating gender discrimination, (2) the regulation
was the least restrictive means of assuring Minnesota’s citizens
“equal access to publicly available goods and services,” and (3)
the regulation imposed only a limited burden on the associational
freedoms of the Jaycees, the Jaycees’ right to expressive
association claim failed.42
1. Intimate Association
Although the Supreme Court’s most in-depth treatment of
the right to intimate association occurred in Roberts,43 the right
was first articulated in Kenneth Karst’s law review article, The
38. Id. at 622; see also Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68
(2006) (asserting that the right to expressive association developed because “[t]he right to
speak is often exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice with the voices of
others[,]” and “[i]f the government were free to restrict individuals’ ability to join together
and speak, it could essentially silence views that the First Amendment is intended to
protect.”).
39. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 623-26.
43. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
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Freedom of Intimate Association, a mere four years prior to the
right’s constitutional debut.44 Karst’s article and the Roberts
opinion are astoundingly similar.45 Justice Brennan noticeably
omitted any citation to Karst’s article in his Roberts opinion.46
However, several commentators have suggested that the Supreme
Court adopted much of Karst’s intimate association framework,47
one even suggesting that the Supreme Court “lifted the right to
intimate association from Karst’s article.”48
Thus, while Karst’s article did not determine the parameters
of the right to intimate association, it is highly instructive, as it
was almost certainly the Supreme Court’s inspiration of the
right.49 Karst defined an intimate association as “a close and
familiar personal relationship with another that is in some
significant way comparable to a marriage or family relationship.
An intimate association, like any group, is more than the sum of
its members; it is a new being, a collective individuality with a
life of its own.”50 Karst argued that the right to intimate
association is an expansive, broad right, protected not only under
the First Amendment, but also under substantive due process and
equal protection principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.51 Importantly, he also argued that the right to

44. Karst, supra note 21, at 624; Gwynne L. Skinner, Intimate Association and the
First Amendment, 3 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 3 (1993).
45. For a comprehensive analysis of the similarities between Karst’s article and the
Supreme Court’s Roberts opinion, see Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate
Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 269, 278-79
(2006).
46. Inazu, supra note 25, at 165; Roberts, 468 U.S. 609. Justice Brennan is lucky he
did not have a faculty advisor reviewing his opinion. Although, I suppose Professor Karst is
not too upset, his idea has become enduring constitutional law after all.
47. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 45, at 276; Inazu, supra note 25, 158-68 (“Brennan’s
Roberts opinion never cites Karst’s article, but the intellectual debt is apparent.”); Joshua P.
Roling, Functional Intimate Association Analysis: A Doctrinal Shift to Save the Roberts
Framework, 61 DUKE L.J. 903, 909 (2012) (“[M]any of Professor Karst’s values were
reflected in the Court’s rationales for protecting intimate associations.”); Skinner, supra note
44, at 3-8; see generally Collin O. Udell, Intimate Association: Resurrecting a Hybrid Right,
7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 233-39 (1998).
48. Udell, supra note 47, at 232.
49. See supra notes 43-48.
50. Karst, supra note 21, at 629.
51. Id. at 652-67.
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intimate association was not limited to traditional relationships,52
a point where he and Justice Brennan diverged.53
In the thirty-six years since the Supreme Court initially
recognized the right to intimate association in Roberts, it has not
once taken up another case in which it has devoted extensive
attention to clarifying the right.54 There was an initial attempt by
Justice Blackmun to invoke the right in defense of LGBT rights
in Bowers v. Hardwick,55 a mere two years after Roberts was
decided, but to no avail, as the majority opinion in that case did
not even acknowledge the right to intimate association in
formulating its holding.56
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has provided a limited
amount of guidance on “what [an intimate association] is not[.]”57
A few years after Roberts was decided, another very similar case
came before the Supreme Court: Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte.58 Much like in Roberts,
here, Rotary International, an umbrella organization controlling
19,788 local rotary clubs, had a policy limiting official
membership to men.59 The Rotary Club of Duarte, California
(“Duarte Chapter”) decided to start admitting women, to which
Rotary International responded by revoking the club’s charter.60
The Duarte Chapter then sued Rotary International, asserting that
its policy limiting membership to men violated California’s
Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”).61 Rotary International then
claimed that the UCRA violated its right to association.62

52. Id. at 629, 662, 671, 686-87 (claiming that even “close friendship” may be included
in the right to intimate association).
53. Udell, supra note 47, at 238-39 (suggesting that Justice Brennan was “hesitant to
do more than vaguely suggest that the right might move beyond traditional relationships”).
54. See generally id. at 239; Marcus, supra note 45, at 283-84.
55. 478 U.S. 186, 202-03 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I believe that Hardwick
has stated a cognizable claim that [the Georgia sodomy statute] interferes with
constitutionally protected interests in privacy and freedom of intimate association.”).
56. See generally id. at 186 (majority opinion).
57. Marcus, supra note 45, at 283.
58. 481 U.S. 537, 537 (1987).
59. Id. at 539-41.
60. Id. at 541.
61. Id. at 541-42.
62. See id. at 537.
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In applying the Roberts framework to analyze Rotary
International’s intimate association claim,63 the Court
acknowledged that “[w]e have not attempted to mark the precise
boundaries of this type of constitutional protection.”64 It then
went on to cite a plethora of substantive due process cases in order
to exemplify the kinds of relationships deserving constitutional
protection under the right to intimate association.65 However,
ultimately, in employing the Roberts intimate association factors
to Rotary International, the Court held that neither Rotary
International nor its individual Rotary Clubs were entitled to any
degree of intimate association protection.66 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court highlighted several facts: membership
ranged from fewer than twenty to more than nine hundred, about
ten percent of the membership moved away or dropped out every
year, the clubs’ policies stated that they were inclusive, guests
attended meetings, and members from other Rotary Clubs were
required to be admitted to any Rotary Club meeting.67
Surprisingly, the very next year, the Court decided an almost
identical case: New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York.68
Yet again, private clubs sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
human rights law prohibiting discrimination, asserting their right
to association as a defense.69 In analyzing the New York State
Club Association’s claims, the Court failed to even mention the
right to intimate association by name,70 instead choosing to refer
to the vague notion of “private association.”71 Nonetheless, the
Court still employed the Roberts framework and denied the New
York State Club Association’s intimate association claim based
on the facts that most of the clubs were more than four hundred
63. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 545-46.
64. Id. at 545.
65. Id. (first citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); then citing
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (decision to have children); then citing
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child-rearing and education); and then citing
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (cohabitation with relatives)).
66. Id. at 546-47.
67. Id.
68. 487 U.S. 1, 1 (1988).
69. Id. at 7.
70. Marcus, supra note 45, at 284; N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. 1.
71. N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 6, 12.
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members strong, and they all regularly provided service to and
received payments from nonmembers.72
The Court also
emphasized, albeit implicitly, that the regular presence of
strangers at club meetings strongly counsels against the finding
of an intimate association.73
Following New York State Club Ass’n, it seems that large
private clubs learned their lesson (at least for a time), as there was
not another large private club intimate association case to reach
the Supreme Court for another decade.74 However, this did not
stop the Court from invalidating intimate association claims
elsewhere. The year after New York State Club Ass’n, the Court
denied another intimate association claim in City of Dallas v.
Stanglin.75 In Stanglin, the owner of a skating rink brought a
challenge to a city ordinance that prohibited teenagers from
entering the skating rink at certain hours and socializing with
those outside their age group.76 He alleged that the ordinance
interfered with his patrons’ right to associate with persons outside
their age bracket.77 The Court found that the Constitution does
not recognize “a generalized right of ‘social association’ that
includes chance encounters in dance halls.”78 Indeed, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, emphatically held that “[i]t is
clear beyond cavil that dance-hall patrons, who may number
1,000 on any given night, are not engaged in the sort of ‘intimate
human relationships’ referred to in Roberts.”79 However, he
barely explained his reasoning in holding that “coming together
to engage in recreational dancing” does not qualify as a form of
intimate association.80
Continuing the trend of hearing one association focused case
a year, in 1990, the Court reviewed FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas.81 Like in Stanglin, here, owners of Dallas businesses
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
490 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1989).
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25.
493 U.S. 215 (1990).

4 MLAKAR.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

REASSOCIATING STUDENT RIGHTS

2/11/22 3:23 PM

765

brought intimate association claims on behalf of their patrons
against a city licensing scheme that, among other things, required
motel owners to obtain a license if they were to rent rooms for
fewer than ten hours.82 Justice O’Connor, perhaps a bit
sarcastically, held that “we do not believe that limiting motel
room rentals to 10 hours will have any discernible effect on the
sorts of traditional personal bonds to which we referred in
Roberts[,]” and that “[a]ny ‘personal bonds’ that are formed from
the use of a motel room for fewer than 10 hours are not those that
have ‘played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the
Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and
beliefs.’”83 Thus, again, the Court refused to take advantage of
an opportunity to clarify the parameters of the right to intimate
association. Since the Court’s decision in FW/PBS, Inc., there
have been no Supreme Court intimate association cases defining
the doctrine to any appreciable extent.84
In the absence of any clear guideposts, the Circuit Courts of
Appeals have largely been left to their own devices when it comes
to the right to intimate association.85 This has created wide and
varying gaps in the application of the right.86 The central thesis
of one of the most comprehensive legal commentaries on the right
to intimate association to date was that “[w]ith Lawrence [v.
Texas] shining new light on intimate association rights, the Court
could soon decide[] . . . that the time has finally come to clarify
the parameters and protections that define the freedom of intimate
association.”87 Indeed, the Court had a golden opportunity to do
82. Id. at 220-21.
83. Id. at 237 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984)).
84. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 286-87 (first citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000); then citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); and then citing Overton
v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), and discussing how, in each case, the Court did not take
advantage of the opportunity to clarify or define the right to intimate association).
85. Id. at 287.
86. Id. at 288-98 (identifying upwards of ten different tests the Circuit Courts of
Appeals have applied to the right of intimate association since Roberts and describing the
variance as “mind-boggling”) (citing Udell, supra note 47, at 233-39). Professor Marcus
also discusses the “[c]lear cries for clarity” coming from the Circuit Courts of Appeals,
providing as an example a somewhat comical reference to the Second Circuit’s citation of a
Bible verse “to describe its lack of knowledge of the unfixed boundaries of intimate
association.” Id. at 297.
87. Id. at 299.
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exactly that in the recent landmark decision of Obergefell v.
Hodges.88 Obergefell was a major step forward in terms of the
right to intimate association, as it finally broke away from the age
old traditional relationships approach in its holding that “[s]amesex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy
intimate association,” echoing a more Karstian view of the right.89
However, aside from a couple of quick references to the right to
intimate association, the Court yet again refused to clarify its
parameters or provide any meaningful analysis of it. 90 Thus, in
line with the rest of its post-Roberts intimate association
decisions, the Court has allowed the gates of the doctrine of
intimate association to remain wide open, refusing to shut them
for almost forty years.91
2. Expressive Association
The Supreme Court’s most in-depth analysis of the right to
expressive association was also laid out in Roberts.92 The Roberts
definition of an expressive association “requires both an
organization (the association itself) and a purpose (a First
Amendment activity).”93 The right to expressive association
essentially allows an organization to be considered an individual
for purposes of the First Amendment and grants it all the First
Amendment rights and corresponding limitations of such rights
that are bestowed upon the individual.94 Just like the intimate
association jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has provided little

88. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
89. Id. at 646.
90. See id. at 646, 667.
91. My sympathies go out to Professor Marcus. I have only just begun researching the
right to intimate association and I am quite frustrated with the Court’s lack of guidance, while
I know she has watched the Court refuse to define the right for at least fourteen years now.
92. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
93. Randall P. Bezanson et al., Mapping the Forms of Expressive Association, 40 PEPP.
L. REV. 23, 24-25 (2012).
94. Id. For example: viewpoint and content restrictions; prior restraints; public forum
doctrine; time, place, and manner restrictions; etc. See id. That being said, the right still
protects the individuals that participate in these associations, so in a sense, it is also an
individual right. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
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guidance on what exactly qualifies an organization as an
expressive association.95
The first expressive association case to come to the Supreme
Court after Roberts was Board of Directors of Rotary
International.96 Although the UCRA’s interference with Rotary
International’s right to expressive association seemed to warrant
the application of strict scrutiny,97 the Court gave short shrift to
Rotary International’s claim, asserting that “the evidence fails to
demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in
any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out
their various purposes.”98 The Court indicated that Rotary
International was not an expressive association at all, seemingly
because the Rotary Clubs did not take positions on political
issues.99 Moreover, the Court went on to say that even if the
UCRA interfered with Rotary International’s right to expressive
association, the UCRA was “unrelated to the suppression of
ideas” and “serv[ed] the State’s compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women.”100
A nearly identical result occurred in the next expressive
association case to reach the Court, New York State Club Ass’n.101
In this case, however, the New York State Club Association
sought to bring the expressive association claim on behalf of
individual club members, as opposed to on behalf of each
organization as a whole.102 The Court affirmed that the right is
also held by individuals, but unfortunately for the New York State
Club Association, it held that the public accommodations law did
“not affect ‘in any significant way’ the ability of individuals to
form associations that will advocate public or private
viewpoints.”103 The Court went on to justify its decision and lay
95. Bezanson et al., supra note 93, at 25-27.
96. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); see
supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (providing the pertinent facts).
97. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
98. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 548.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 549.
101. N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); see supra notes
68-72 and accompanying text (providing the pertinent facts).
102. N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 1, 13.
103. Id. at 13 (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 548).
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the groundwork for future expressive association litigants in
explaining that:
It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able
to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes
and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints
nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to
those who share the same sex, for example, or the same
religion.104

Following New York State Club Ass’n, the Court briefly
analyzed the right to expressive association in Stanglin.105 Again,
the Court limited the right. Here, the Court held that social
gatherings of strangers do not “involve the sort of expressive
association that the First Amendment has been held to protect.”106
Because the “hundreds of teenagers who congregate each night at
this particular dance hall [were] not members of any organized
association[,]” they were not entitled to the protections of the
right to expressive association.107 The Court noted that “[i]t is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity
a person undertakes . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring
the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”108
After a decade of consistently striking down expressive
association claims, the Court finally upheld an organization’s
right to expressive association in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.109 In Hurley, the
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
(“GLIB”) sought to march in the 1993 Boston St. Patrick’s Day
parade as a way for its members to express their pride in their
Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, to
demonstrate the existence of such individuals, and to express
solidarity with individuals like themselves who were at the time
seeking to march in the very similar New York St. Patrick’s Day

104. Id.
105. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989); see supra notes 75-78 and
accompanying text (providing the pertinent facts).
106. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 25.
109. 515 U.S. 557, 557 (1995).
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parade.110 However, the organizer of the parade, the South
Boston Allied War Veterans Council (“SBVC”), refused to allow
them to march as a group behind their own banner in the
parade.111 GLIB filed suit under the Federal Constitution,
Massachusetts Constitution, and Massachusetts public
accommodations laws.112 SBVC asserted its right to expressive
association in justifying its exclusion of GLIB.113
The Court began its analysis of SBVC’s expressive
association claim by acknowledging that parades are indeed a
form of expressive action.114 For once, the Court seemed to
broaden the right, in finding that “a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection.”115
Additionally, the Court found that “a private speaker does not
forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an
exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”116
In combining these principles, the Court found that, although
there were a multitude of different groups with different ideas in
the parade, because SBVC “decided to exclude a message it did
not like from the communication it chose to make, . . . that is
enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its
expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on
another.”117 Thus, although Massachusetts had a compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation,
it could not defeat SBVC’s right to expressive association.118
The Court again expanded the right to expressive association
in the case of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.119 Here, the Boy
Scouts of America (“BSA”) sought to exclude an assistant
110. Id. at 561.
111. Id. at 560, 572. Importantly, SBVC was a private organization, however, the
parade still involved state action in that the City of Boston authorized the SBVC to organize
it. Id. at 560. It is also important to note that the parade had been a state-sponsored event
from as early as 1737 to as late as 1947. Id. at 560.
112. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
113. Id. at 563.
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id. at 569 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam)).
116. Id. at 569-70.
117. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569, 574.
118. Id. at 572, 575.
119. 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000).
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scoutmaster (Dale), who had been a longtime member of the
BSA, upon discovering that he was openly gay.120 Dale then filed
suit under New Jersey’s public accommodations law.121 The
Court established several universal rules for the right to
expressive association.
First, “[t]he First Amendment’s
protection of expressive association is not reserved for advocacy
groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must engage in
some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”122
Relatedly, “associations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’
of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. An association must merely
engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be
entitled to protection.”123 Furthermore, instilling a system of
values constitutes expression within the meaning of the right.124
Finally, courts must give deference to an “association’s assertions
regarding the nature of its expression, [and its] view of what
would impair its expression.”125
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the New Jersey public
accommodations law violated the BSA’s right to expressive
association.126 However, it is unclear which test the Court applied
to the law in striking it down. Although, in citing to the previous
association cases, the Court made vague references to
“compelling state interest[s]” and “serious burden[s],” it did not
expressly state whether it was applying strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, or something entirely different in analyzing
the validity of the New Jersey public accommodations law.127
Rather, the Court said that “[i]n Hurley, we applied traditional
First Amendment analysis” and “the analysis we applied there is
similar to the analysis we apply here.”128

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
Hurley).
128.

Id. at 643-45.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 655.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 657-59 (referencing Roberts, Bd. of Dirs. Int’l, N.Y. State Club Ass’n, and
Id. at 659.
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Thus, the right to expressive association jurisprudence has,
like the right to intimate association jurisprudence, left the lower
courts in flux. Although the right has always been considered a
correlative right of sorts,129 it has become less of a freestanding
right of its own over the years and increasingly more of a branch
of free speech doctrine. Since the Court’s decision in Dale, the
Court has not yet decided another expressive association case
outside of the education context, which I turn to next.130
B. First Amendment Education Jurisprudence
While the Supreme Court has rarely forayed into the realm
of the First Amendment rights of students, especially university
students, there are a few seminal cases that guide lower courts.131
This section proceeds as follows: first, I will discuss the
education quartet; second, I will review off-campus speech
jurisprudence generally; and finally, I will examine the Court’s
treatment of university students’ First Amendment associational
rights specifically. This context is crucial to understanding how
the Court’s approach to university student associational rights
developed and the many problems surrounding its practical
application.
1. The Education Quartet
Because of the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the
education realm, there are not many cases governing the First
Amendment rights of students, especially in the university setting.
Indeed, the Court has provided so little guidance that the lower
courts have consistently relied on the education quartet, a string
of four First Amendment student rights cases that were decided
in the primary and secondary education context.132 The education
129. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
130. See infra Section II.B.2.b. Unfortunately, the expressive association jurisprudence
only gets more complex.
131. See infra notes 132-210 and accompanying text.
132. This reliance has engendered much scholarly commentary. Most commentators
are staunchly opposed to the imposition of these primary and secondary education cases in
the context of the public university setting. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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quartet consists of:
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,133 Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,134 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,135 and Morse
v. Frederick.136
a. Tinker
The renowned line from Justice Fortas’s opinion in Tinker
that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate,”137 has been quoted so often that it has
almost become a cliché.138 In Tinker, elementary, junior high, and
high school students planned to wear black armbands to class in
protest of the Vietnam War.139 Upon hearing about this plan,
school administrators adopted a policy “that any student wearing
an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he
refused he would be suspended until he returned without the
armband.”140 The students indeed wore the armbands to school
and, not surprisingly, were suspended pursuant to the policy.141
They then brought First Amendment claims against the school
and its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.142
The Court began by emphasizing “the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials,
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools,”143 seemingly

133. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
134. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
135. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
136. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
137. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
138. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Lindsay, supra note 14, at
1489; Andrew R. Kloster, Speech Codes Slipping Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Current Issues
in Students’ Rights, 81 UMKC L. REV. 617, 617 (2013); Marcia E. Powers, Unraveling
Tinker: The Seventh Circuit Leaves Student Speech Hanging by a Thread, 4 SEVENTH CIR.
REV. 215, 219 (2008). That of course is not going to stop me from quoting it anyways, as
you may have noticed.
139. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504; id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 504 (majority opinion).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
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signaling defeat of the students’ claims. However, it went on to
find that:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute
authority over their students. Students in school as well as
out of school are “persons” under our Constitution. They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to
the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views.144

Thus, the Court found that the First Amendment remains a
bulwark against governmental authority even in the classroom
setting. However, in acknowledging that First Amendment rights
must be “applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment,”145 the Court did establish a limitation to its
protections: school administrators may discipline students for
conduct that “materially and substantially interfer[es]” with the
operation of the school.146
b. Fraser
Following Tinker, the Court decided Fraser. In Fraser, a
high school student gave a sexually explicit, “indecent, lewd, and
offensive” speech at a school assembly, in front of 600 other
students, many of whom were fourteen-years-old.147 School

144. Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 506.
146. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
However, the school may not seek to discipline the student on the basis of her viewpoint
alone. Id. at 509, 511 (“In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
147. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986).
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officials then suspended the student for three days.148 The student
subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on
the violation of his First Amendment rights.149 In holding that the
“School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in
imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his offensively
lewd and indecent speech,”150 the Court reasoned that “the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”151 Furthermore, the Court established an additional rule
for future First Amendment education cases:
the First
Amendment does not prohibit schools from regulating speech that
“would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”152
c. Hazelwood
Following Fraser, the Court gave even more power to
schools and their officials to regulate the First Amendment rights
of their students. In Hazelwood, high school journalism students
sought to publish certain articles about teen pregnancy and
divorce in their student-run newspaper.153 However, because the
articles contained identifying information about students and
references to sexual activity and birth control, the principal
prohibited their publication.154 The students then sued the school
and its officials, seeking a declaration that their First Amendment
rights had been violated.155 The Court unequivocally denied the
students’ request for relief in holding that “educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related

148. Id. at 678.
149. Id. at 679.
150. Id. at 685.
151. Id. at 682.
152. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
153. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1988). Importantly,
the newspaper was part of the school’s journalism curriculum. Id. at 262.
154. Id. at 263-64.
155. Id. at 264.
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to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”156 Importantly, however,
the Court limited this holding to the primary and secondary
context in stating that “[w]e need not now decide whether the
same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to schoolsponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”157
d. Morse
Finally, in Morse, a high school principal suspended a
student for ten days after the student waived a banner that said
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus, school-approved
event.158 After exhausting his administrative appeals, the student
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the principal and
the school board violated his First Amendment rights.159 Morse
was a much different case than the other three of the education
quartet in that the student’s speech in this case occurred off
campus.160 However, the Court reasoned this extremely pertinent
fact away in finding, among other things, that:
The event occurred during normal school hours. It was
sanctioned by Principal Morse “as an approved social event
or class trip,” and the school district’s rules expressly
provide that pupils in “approved social events and class trips
are subject to district rules for student conduct[.]” Teachers
and administrators were interspersed among the students and
charged with supervising them.161

Because of these factual findings, the Court ultimately
decided that the school had authority over the student’s speech
and that “a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment,
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”162 Although
156. Id. at 273. One is left wondering what school administrators could not identify as
a “legitimate pedagogical concern.”
157. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (emphasis added).
158. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397-98 (2007). Technically it was “off
campus,” although it was right across the street from the school. Id. at 397.
159. Id. at 398-99.
160. Id. at 397.
161. Id. at 400-01 (internal citations omitted).
162. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401, 403.
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the Court ultimately decided that the school had the authority to
discipline the student here, it was cautious in issuing this opinion,
noting that “[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as
to when courts should apply school speech precedents . . . but not
on these facts,” clearly indicating that the school’s authority to
regulate students’ off-campus First Amendment rights is not
synonymous with on-campus authority.163 Indeed, the Court
confirmed this when it referenced its earlier decision in Fraser,
stating that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public
forum outside the school context, it would have been
protected.”164
Given this important on-campus/off-campus dichotomy the
Court explicitly created in the Morse opinion, one would think
that the Court would have taken up an off-campus speech case in
the thirteen years since the decision. Despite numerous
opportunities to do so, the Court has refused to provide any
guidance. Indeed, since its decision in Morse, the Supreme Court
has remained silent on the authority of school administrators to
regulate the off-campus speech rights of their students both in the
primary/secondary and university settings.165 Thus, the Court has
again left the lower courts to their own devices, resulting in a
myriad of different approaches.166
163. Id. at 401.
164. Id. at 405.
165. Benjamin A. Holden, Tinker Meets the Cyberbully: A Federal Circuit Conflict
Round-Up and Proposed New Standard for Off-Campus Speech, 28 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 233, 285 (2018); Marcus Hauer, Note, The Constitutionality of
Public University Bans of Student-Athlete Speech Through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV.
413, 427 (2012); Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, Who’s Looking at Your Facebook Profile? The
Use of Student Conduct Codes to Censor College Students’ Online Speech, 45 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 261, 290 (2008) (“[T]he Court has remained silent on several issues related to college
speech. These issues include, among others, whether college administrators can discipline
college students for off-campus speech, what constitutes off-campus speech, and whether
student publications receiving financial support from the college or university can be
afforded First Amendment protection.”); Kloster, supra note 138, at 618; Emily Deyring,
“Professional Standards” in Public University Programs: Must the Court Defer to the
University on First Amendment Concerns?, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 237, 241 (2019) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific issue of university student speech offcampus.”); Lindsay, supra note 14, at 1483 (“[T]he Supreme Court has never upheld a
student-speech restriction at the university level.”).
166. For an absolutely fantastic description of the current Circuit Courts of Appeals’
approaches to the question of the authority of primary and secondary public schools to
regulate the off-campus speech of their students, see Holden, supra note 165, at 257-79.
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2. The University
I am sure at this point you are wondering what a bunch of
free-speech primary and secondary education cases have to do
with the university and associational rights. You are not alone;
many legal commentators have questioned, even challenged, the
imposition of Tinker and its progeny in the university context.167
However, the federal circuits have not been so hesitant; indeed,
many of them have applied Tinker and its progeny to the
university context, at least in speech cases, both on and off
campus.168 Although it did not expressly so hold, the Supreme
167. Id. at 250 n.85 (“[T]he applicability of Tinker’s holding to public colleges remains
open.”); Beckstrom, supra note 165, at 307 (“Tinker is a K-12 student speech standard, and
therefore, this standard should not be applied to college student speech.”); Deyring, supra
note 165, at 253 (“Courts must not look to the standards set forth in Tinker and Hazelwood
but must treat students in professional university programs as mature adults who are not in
need of the same paternalistic stance.”); Lindsay, supra note 14, at 1480, 1483 (arguing that
college students are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as other adults and
stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet held explicitly that Tinker or its progeny do not
apply to college speech, but the Court also has never applied Tinker in a post-secondaryspeech case.”); LoMonte, supra note 13, at 306, 342-43 (arguing that none of the purposes
animating Hazelwood apply in the university setting and stating that “[i]t is incongruous with
the law’s otherwise consistent treatment of adult-aged college students—who are eligible to
vote, join the military, purchase firearms, sign contracts, incur civil and criminal liability in
adult court and otherwise bear the legal indicia of adulthood—to regard them as
‘constitutional children’ whose speech is of no greater legal dignity than that of an eighthgrader.”). However, LoMonte concedes that Tinker applies in the university setting. Id. at
311.
168. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 2004)
(applying Hazelwood to a university student’s First Amendment claims); Hosty v. Carter,
412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); Esfeller v. O’Keefe, 391 F. App’x 337, 341 (5th
Cir. 2010) (same); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 304, 317 n.17 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citing Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood in analyzing a graduate student’s First Amendment
claims); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 865, 875-76 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying
Hazelwood to a graduate student’s First Amendment claims); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727,
733-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[n]othing in Hazelwood suggests a stop-go distinction
between student speech at the high school and university levels, and we decline to create
one.”); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 531-32 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that college
administrators could discipline a nursing student for his off-campus speech so long as their
actions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”) (quoting Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). But see, e.g., Student Gov’t Ass’n v.
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood . . . is not
applicable to college newspapers.”); Amidon v. Student Ass’n of State Univ. of N.Y. at
Albany, 508 F.3d 94, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ases like Hazelwood explicitly reserved the
question of whether the ‘substantial deference’ shown to high school administrators was
‘appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college or
university level.”); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining to
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Court’s decision in Papish v. Board of Curators169 indicated that
the First Amendment rights of university students are far more
expansive than those of primary and secondary education
students.170
a. Papish
In Papish, a graduate student at the University of Missouri
School of Journalism was expelled for distributing a non-schoolsponsored newspaper on campus because it depicted policemen
raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice and
contained an article with the headline “Motherfucker
Acquitted.”171 The Court, “while recognizing a state university’s
undoubted prerogative to enforce reasonable rules governing
student conduct,” reaffirmed that “state colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment.”172 Indeed, although the Court cited to Tinker, there
was no mention of its “material and substantial interference” test
here.173 Arguably, the Court did not apply Tinker’s test because
the University of Missouri was discriminating on the basis of
Papish’s viewpoint,174 and thus, the Court did not dispel Tinker’s
application to the university setting. Nonetheless, the Court
certainly would not require primary and secondary school
administrators to permit their students to bring something to
school depicting a rape, accompanied by a word like

extend the education quartet to the university setting because they “fail[] to account for the
vital importance of academic freedom at public colleges and universities.”).
169. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
170. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
171. Papish, 410 U.S. at 667.
172. Id. at 669-70 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
173. Id. at 670; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
174. The Court stated that while it has “repeatedly approved [the University’s]
regulatory authority” to “enforce reasonable regulations as to the time, place, and manner of
speech and its dissemination[,]” the only reason Papish was expelled was “because of the
disapproved content of the newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its
distribution.” Papish, 410 U.S. at 670 (emphasis added). This is indeed in line with those
circumstances in which the Court has held that even in the primary and secondary education
context, Tinker’s test would not apply. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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“Motherfucker.”175 Thus, Papish stands for the proposition that
the First Amendment rights of university students are not
coextensive with those of primary and secondary students, even
if Tinker and its progeny apply.
b. University Association
Support for the proposition that Tinker applies in the
university setting, even to college students’ associational rights,
rests in Healy v. James.176 In Healy, the President of Central
Connecticut State College (“CCSC”) denied official recognition
to a group of students who desired to form a local chapter of
Students for a Democratic Society (“SDS”) because the
organization would constitute a “disruptive influence” on
campus, and perhaps a little ironically, because the group “openly
repudiate[d]” CCSC’s dedication to academic freedom.177 After
exhausting their administrative remedies, the students brought a
First Amendment right to association claim seeking to force
CCSC and its administrators to officially recognize SDS.178 The
Court began by proclaiming that “state colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment.”179
Immediately after, it confirmed that Tinker applies to the
university setting.180 Indeed, the Court quoted Tinker to
emphasize the need for deference to school administrators.181
Despite this confirmation, the Court nonetheless found that “the
precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections
175. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986)
(upholding suspension of student for making sexual innuendos during his speech at a school
assembly in which fourteen-year-olds were in the audience).
176. 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
177. Id. at 170-72, 174-76, 179.
178. Id. at 177.
179. Id. at 180.
180. Id. (quoting Tinker extensively and applying it to the university setting).
181. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (“And, where state-operated educational institutions are
involved, this Court has long recognized ‘the need for affirming the comprehensive authority
of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.’”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)) (emphasis added).
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should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large.”182
Thus, the Court’s opinion began quite paradoxically. On the
one hand, a primary and secondary education case controls the
First Amendment rights of full-grown adult college students and
university administrators must receive “comprehensive” judicial
deference,183 but on the other hand, the First Amendment applies
with the same amount of force on college campuses as it does
everywhere else.184 The confusion did not end there. Throughout
the opinion, the Court announced at least two different tests that
could be applicable in the university association context. First,
the Court noted that “[w]hile a college has a legitimate interest in
preventing disruption on the campus, which under circumstances
requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such a
restraint, a ‘heavy burden’ rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action.”185 This test in itself could be
construed as rational basis review, rational basis plus, or even one
of the multitudinous versions of intermediate scrutiny.
Second, although the first test proposed by the Court
indicated that university students have powerful associational
rights on campus, the Court went on to say that “[a]lso
prohibitable are actions which ‘materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’”186 If you are
thinking this is not a high threshold to meet, you would be right,
as “[a]ssociational activities need not be tolerated where they
infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or
substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to
obtain an education.”187 Importantly, the Court does not define
the bounds of what constitutes a “reasonable campus rule[],” even
in its holding that “[a] college administration may impose a
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 184.
186. Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
187. Id. Although, in line with Tinker, university administrators cannot restrict these
associational activities based on an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.”
Id. at 191 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). Rather, there must be “substantial evidence”
that there will be a Tinker violation. Id. at 190-91.
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requirement . . . that a group seeking official recognition affirm
in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law.”188
Despite the highly deferential sounding language of the
second test, in a footnote, the court tacked onto the end of it that:
It may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a
legitimate and substantial state interest. Where state action
designed to regulate prohibitable action also restricts
associational rights—as nonrecognition does—the State
must demonstrate that the action taken is reasonably related
to protection of the State’s interest and that “the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”189

The Court ultimately reversed the lower courts and remanded the
case in light of all the new standards.190 Thus, although the
standards coming out of the Healy opinion appear to be quite
confusing, the principle that may be derived from the case is that,
while college students have strong First Amendment
associational rights generally, on campus, these rights are subject
to reasonable campus rules, and the Court will defer to university
administrators as to what counts as a reasonable campus rule.191
Seemingly, as long as the university does not discriminate on the
basis of the organization’s viewpoint, the Court will likely side
with the decisions of its school officials.192
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Healy in similar
cases.193 It has also continued the trend of deferring to university
administrators’ on-campus regulations, provided that they do not
discriminate on the basis of a student’s viewpoint.194 The Court
has afforded so much deference, in fact, that legal commentators
have said that “the Supreme Court’s deference to educational
188. Id. at 189, 193.
189. Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 n.20 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
190. Id. at 194.
191. Id. at 180, 189.
192. See id. at 189-93.
193. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65, 276-77 (1981); see generally
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
194. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5, 668 (asserting in the association context that “[a]
university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a
university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities.”).
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judgment involving college students is an honor.”195 This is hard
to square with the equally repetitive maxim that the Court
employs in university cases, that “[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.”196
The proverbial nail in the coffin of university students’ oncampus associational rights occurred in the Court’s most recent
university association case, Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez.197 In Christian Legal Society, Hastings College of Law
(“Hastings”) refused to grant official recognition to a religious
student organization, the Christian Legal Society (“CLS”),
because the CLS refused to change its by-laws to accord with
Hastings’ “all-comers” policy.198 CLS then sued Hastings,
claiming that Hastings violated the CLS’s First Amendment
rights to free speech and expressive association.199 In an
unprecedented opinion,200 the Court held that CLS’s “expressiveassociation and free-speech arguments merge[,]” and that it
“makes little sense to treat CLS’s speech and association claims
as discrete.”201 It reasoned that Hastings’ registered student
organization (“RSO”) program was a limited public forum and
that three observations provide the basis for why the association
claim should also be analyzed under the limited public forum
doctrine.202 First, “speech and expressive-association rights are
closely linked,” and “[w]hen these intertwined rights arise in
exactly the same context, it would be anomalous for a restriction
on speech to survive constitutional review under our limitedpublic-forum test only to be invalidated as an impermissible
infringement of expressive association.”203
195. J. Wes Kiplinger, Defining Off-Campus Misconduct that “Impacts the Mission”:
A New Approach, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 87, 112 (2006).
196. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
197. 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
198. Id. at 669, 672-73. The CLS’s by-laws required its members and officers to sign
a “Statement of Faith,” affirming certain beliefs and promising to live their lives in
accordance with the Statement. Id. at 672. The by-laws excluded from affiliation members
of different faiths and those of the LGBTQ community. Id.
199. Id. at 668. I told you we would get back to it eventually.
200. Pun intended.
201. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 680.
202. Id. at 680-82.
203. Id. at 680-81.
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Second, applying the strict scrutiny that the Court typically
affords expressive association claims in this context would
destroy “a defining characteristic of limited public forums—the
State may ‘reserv[e] [them] for certain groups.’”204 Third, the
Court found that “this case fits comfortably within the limitedpublic-forum category, for CLS, in seeking what is effectively a
state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to modify its
membership policies; CLS may exclude any person for any
reason if it forgoes the benefits of official recognition.”205
Following its justification for employing the limited public
forum doctrine here, the Court went on to hold that Hastings’
policy was both “reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”206 In the
analysis of the reasonableness of Hastings’ policy, Justice
Ginsburg cited to the (hopefully) now familiar precedents of
Hazelwood and Tinker.207 In line with the increasingly substantial
amount of deference the Court has provided to university
administrators in their regulation of students’ constitutional
rights, Justice Ginsburg discussed how “[s]chools, we have
emphasized, enjoy ‘a significant measure of authority over the
type of officially recognized activities in which their students
participate.’ We therefore ‘approach our task with special
caution,’ mindful that Hastings’ decisions about the character of
its student-group program are due decent respect.”208
Thus, the unifying principle derivable from the university
association precedents is that university administrators may
regulate the associational rights of their students on campus so
long as their regulations are reasonable, and the Court will defer
to the university in determining what is reasonable. Indeed, the
Court has even indicated that this general principle applies to

204. Id. at 681 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
205. Id. at 682. This final reason is quite surprising given Justice Powell’s description
of the myriad detriments that the SDS would have suffered, and did suffer, as a result of
CCSC’s denial of official recognition in Healy. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181-84
(1972).
206. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 697.
207. Id. at 686.
208. Id. at 686-87 (first quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 240 (1990); and then quoting Healy, 408 U.S. at 171) (internal citations omitted).
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RSOs off campus,209 and potentially even off-campus, non-RSO,
school-sponsored associational activities.210 Yet, the Supreme
Court has never expressly so held. Thus, important questions
remain unanswered: may public universities regulate their
students’ on-campus associational activities that are not school
sponsored? What about associational activities that are off
campus but school sponsored? Associational activities that are
off campus but that have nothing to do with the school? What
framework should the Court apply? These questions are what I
turn to next.
III. PROPOSED THREE-TIERED FRAMEWORK
The inevitable conclusion one must draw from analyzing
these numerous and often conflicting bodies of law is that there is
not a clear test for courts to apply when reviewing the
constitutionality of university regulations impacting their
students’ associational rights. The Court has simply not
adequately developed the law in this area. Thus, in this section, I
propose that the Court adopt a three-tiered framework for
reviewing the constitutionality of these regulations. Importantly,
the three tiers are not rigid, unforgiving concepts, but rather, they
are meant to be guideposts for the Court along a sliding scale of
judicial scrutiny.211 Indeed, I realize, as often happens in the law,
that there exist gray areas in which student conduct does not
neatly fit into any one of the three tiers. A flexible approach such
as this one allows the Court to take into account the idiosyncrasies
of each case while also providing clear guidance to university
administrators and lower courts. My approach is consistent with
209. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000)
(“We make no distinction between campus activities and the off-campus expressive activities
of objectionable RSO’s.”).
210. See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 686-87 (“A college’s commission—and
its concomitant license to choose among pedagogical approaches—is not confined to the
classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of the educational
process.”).
211. The concept of a sliding scale of judicial scrutiny is not new to First Amendment
analysis, as the Court has explicitly recognized that “not every interference with speech
triggers the same degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
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the values and realities acknowledged by the Court in its prior
jurisprudence and represents principles extracted from existing
law.
In the first tier, the university is at the height of its authority
to regulate when the associational activity is on campus and
school sponsored. The courts are to review university regulations
of students’ associational activities which fall into this tier under
the rational basis test. In the second tier, the university retains a
significant amount of authority to regulate. Situations that fall
into the second tier are those in which the associational activities
are either off campus and school sponsored, or on campus and not
school sponsored. The courts are to review university regulations
of students’ associational activities which fall into this second tier
under the intermediate scrutiny test. Finally, in the last tier is offcampus, non-school-sponsored associational activities, where the
university’s authority to regulate is at its trough. University
attempts to regulate associational activities which fall into this
third tier must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny test.
A. Tier 1: Rational Basis
Under the first tier of the proposed framework, university
regulation of on-campus, school-sponsored associational activity
must be reviewed under the rational basis test. The rational basis
test requires that university regulations “be rationally related to
legitimate government interests.”212 Although it is the lowest
standard of judicial review, and almost any regulation will pass
constitutional muster under this test,213 it makes sense to employ
it in the context of on-campus, school-sponsored associational
activity for several reasons.
First, the Court already provides an enormous degree of
deference to the decisions of university administrators when it
comes to on-campus regulations, even in the associational

212. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
213. See Christen Sproule, The Pursuit of Happiness and the Right to Sexual Privacy:
A Proposal for a Modified Rational Basis Review for Due Process Rights, 5 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 791, 809 (2004).
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context.214 Second, on campus, the Court has consistently
recognized that all that is required of university administrators is
that their regulations of students’ First Amendment rights be
“reasonable.”215 Third, simply by definition, the right to intimate
association will almost certainly never be implicated in the
context of an on-campus, school-sponsored association, and
therefore, the balancing test prescribed by the Roberts Court will
not apply in this first tier.216 Fourth, in citing to Hazelwood in her
Christian Legal Society opinion,217 Justice Ginsburg implied that,
214. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“And, where state-operated
educational institutions are involved, this Court has long recognized ‘the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.’”)
(emphasis added) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969)); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (asserting in the association
context that “[a] university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never
denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that
mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.”) (emphasis added); Southworth, 529 U.S.
at 232 (“It is not for the Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in
an institution of higher learning.”); Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 686-87 (“Schools, we
have emphasized, enjoy ‘a significant measure of authority over the type of officially
recognized activities in which their students participate.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240 (1990)); Kiplinger, supra note
195, at 112 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s deference to educational judgment involving
college students is an honor.”); Beckstrom, supra note 165, at 278; Chapin Cimino, Campus
Citizenship and Associational Freedom: An Aristotelian Take on the Nondiscrimination
Puzzle, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 548 (2011) (“[W]hen the association is a student
group meeting on a public university campus, the university receives more deference from
the court than would the state regulator if the association met off campus.”); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1815
(2017) (“[W]hile the Court has not directly held that universities are entitled to a measure of
deference when they restrict student speech on campus, in recent years the Court has
expressly embraced deference in the affirmative action and freedom of association
contexts.”).
215. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5 (“A university’s mission is education, and decisions
of this Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations
compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.”) (emphasis added);
Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1973) (recognizing a public university’s
“undoubted prerogative to enforce reasonable rules governing student conduct.”) (emphasis
added); Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 (“Associational activities need not be tolerated where they
infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.”) (emphasis added); Christian Legal
Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 697.
216. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984); see also Vill. of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2-3, 7-9 (1974) (holding that even a group of six college students who
shared a home together off campus were not entitled to any substantive due process
protection).
217. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 686.
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at least for on-campus, school-sponsored associations, university
“educators do not offend the First Amendment . . . so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”218
Fifth, the Court established in Christian Legal Society that
when an on-campus, school-sponsored student organization
brings an expressive association claim, this claim cannot be
disaggregated from speech because “[w]hen these intertwined
rights arise in exactly the same context, it would be anomalous
for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review under
our limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an
impermissible infringement of expressive association.”219
Therefore, the Court in that case implicitly concluded that any oncampus, school-sponsored expressive association claim must not
be reviewed under anything more than rational basis review, as
this analysis would invalidate the requisite limited public forum
analysis of the speech claim.220 Finally, even the rational basis
test would prohibit the university from blatantly discriminating
against a particular association based on its viewpoint.221
B. Tier 2: Intermediate Scrutiny
Under the second tier of the proposed framework, university
regulation of (1) off-campus, school-sponsored or (2) on-campus,
non-school-sponsored associational activity must be reviewed
under the intermediate scrutiny test. The intermediate scrutiny
test requires that the university’s regulations further an important
state interest and do so by means that are substantially related to

218. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
219. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 680-81.
220. See id. at 679-81.
221. See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (“[T]he State[] may
not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group
to be abhorrent.”); Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1973); Christian Legal
Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 667-68, 683-84; Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 233 (2000). See also Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (“For the
University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks
the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s
intellectual life, its college and university campuses.”).

4 MLAKAR.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/22 3:23 PM

788

Vol. 74:4

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

that interest.222 Although intermediate scrutiny is largely
associated with the Equal Protection context,223 it has found a
home in several tenets of First Amendment doctrine as well.224
Thus, its application to the associational rights of university
students, a First Amendment right, is not unprecedented.225
1. Off-Campus, School-Sponsored
Many of the reasons justifying the use of rational basis
review in the context of on-campus, school-sponsored
associational activities also apply in this context. For example,
because these associational activities are still school sponsored,
Justice Ginsburg’s indication that Hazelwood applies in the
university setting suggests that even off campus, “educators do
not offend the First Amendment . . . so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”226
However, in the off-campus context, this justification would only
apply in limited circumstances. For example, the university
would have substantially more authority to regulate a schoolsponsored organization’s activities at a regional competition,
where the organization is officially representing the school, than
it would if the school-sponsored organization was simply meeting
off campus to socialize.227 Yet, because the organization in this
222. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
223. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)
(associating intermediate scrutiny with equal protection claims related to race, alienage,
national origin, gender, and illegitimacy).
224. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 636-37, 661-62 (applying
intermediate scrutiny to “must-carry provisions” intruding on “cable speech” by requiring
cable operators to carry the signals of a specified number of local broadcast television
stations); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-803 (1989) (applying a
heightened version of intermediate scrutiny to a city’s volume control regulation); United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a law
imposing criminal penalties for destroying selective service cards); Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980) (applying a version of
intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech).
225. This is especially true given Justice Powell’s quoting of O’Brien in his Healy
opinion. Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 n.20 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
226. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 686; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
227. Naturally, the university’s interest in regulating would be much stronger in the
former as opposed to the latter.
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context is still school sponsored, the university retains entitlement
to significant judicial deference in regulating its activities.228
Further, as before, by definition, a school-sponsored association
is almost certainly never going to qualify as intimate, even if it is
off campus.229
The main difference between the first tier, and this first
category of the second tier is, of course, that the associational
activities are occurring off campus.
This distinction is
enormously important. Even in the context of primary and
secondary education, the Court has noted in dicta that First
Amendment activity off campus is entitled to far greater
protection than it would have on campus.230 Many legal
commentators agree.231 However, the Court has also noted that
there is “no distinction between [on-]campus activities and the
off-campus expressive activities of objectionable RSO’s,” and
that the university “is free to enact viewpoint neutral rules
restricting off-campus travel or other expenditure by RSO’s, for
it may create what is tantamount to a limited public forum if the
principles of viewpoint neutrality are respected.”232
Given this holding, the associational rights of university
students in this context clearly could not be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Thus, on the one hand, associational activities in this
context are entitled to more protection than rational basis review
228. See supra notes 208-10, 214 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. But see Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000) (noting that “[u]niversities, like all
of society, are finding that traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difficult to
insist upon in an age marked by revolutionary changes in communications, information
transfer, and the means of discourse.”).
231. See, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 14, at 1488-89 (“The very premise of Tinker—that
students do not shed their First Amendment right to free speech at the ‘schoolhouse gate’—
indicates that the restrictions at stake occur at school.”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); Beckstrom, supra note 165, at 299-300
(“[F]ederal courts should . . . adopt an unequivocal standard that . . . universities cannot
discipline college students for off-campus speech unless such speech constitutes a true threat
or a crime under existing law.”); Cimino, supra note 214, at 550-51 (“[G]iven the Court’s
expressive association cases, it seems that associational freedom is more likely to prevail off
campus rather than on campus . . . .”); Hauer, supra note 165, at 433 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has not fully addressed whether a school has the power to restrict off-campus speech, but the
decision in Morse suggests that such restrictions will face high scrutiny and may be found to
fall outside the realm of school regulation.”).
232. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234.
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by virtue of their being off campus. However, on the other hand,
they are not entitled to strict scrutiny review because of the
school-sponsored nature of the organizations.
Therefore,
intermediate scrutiny is the best test to apply to student
associational activity falling into this category because it
adequately balances both the off-campus nature of the
associational activities and the university’s interests, while not
providing too much weight to either. Again, the university would
never be permitted to discriminate against an association based
on its viewpoint alone.233
2. On-Campus, Non-School-Sponsored
The primary reason justifying the maintenance of heightened
deference to the university in this context is the fact that the
associational activity is occurring on campus. One of the most
oft-quoted lines from Tinker and the Court’s education
jurisprudence is that “First Amendment rights must be analyzed
‘in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.’”234
Associational activities are often loud,
rambunctious, or at the very least involve many people. “[I]n
light of the special characteristics of the [university]
environment,” then, universities must have substantial authority
to regulate these activities in order to prevent disruption on
campus.235 Indeed, the Court in Healy held that, “[w]hile a
college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the
campus, which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of
that interest may justify such restraint, a ‘heavy burden’ rests on
the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.”236
The Court went on to further define the contours of this holding
in stating that:

233. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (quoting Tinker, 393
U.S. at 506); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685-86 (2010) (same);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (same); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (same).
235. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 513.
236. Healy, 408 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added).
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The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere
advocacy and advocacy “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce
such action.” . . . . Also prohibitable are actions which
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline
of the school.” Associational activities need not be tolerated
where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt
classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of
other students to obtain an education.237

However, the university is not at the height of its authority
to regulate in this context, as it was in the first tier, because the
association is not school sponsored. The associational activities
do not implicate a “legitimate pedagogical concern[]” beyond the
disruption of classes because the organizations are not supported
by the school.238 Additionally, unlike in the first tier, here,
because the organizations are not school sponsored, they have
several arguments potentially implicating the right to intimate
association. Furthermore, the expressive association claims of
these organizations are not necessarily confined to the limited
public forum analysis of their school-sponsored counterparts.239
Indeed, many spaces on college campuses could be considered
truly public forums, where no such limitations can exist.240 Thus,
the intermediate scrutiny test is again the best test to apply in these
circumstances because it adequately balances the “special
characteristics of the school environment” and the university’s
interests in preventing disruption with the student’s more
extensive associational rights.241

237. Id. at 188-89 (first quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); and
then quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513) (internal citations omitted).
238. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
239. See supra notes 197-208, 219-21, 232-33 and accompanying text.
240. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5 (1981) (“This Court has recognized
that the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the
characteristics of a public forum.”); id. at 267-68 (“The Constitution forbids a State to
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not
required to create the forum in the first place.”).
241. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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C. Tier 3: Strict Scrutiny

Lastly, under the third and final tier of the proposed
framework, university regulation of off-campus, non-schoolsponsored associational activities should be subject to the most
rigorous standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny. The strict
scrutiny test requires the university to affirmatively demonstrate
that the regulation “furthers a compelling [state] interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,” meaning that the
regulation employs the least restrictive means possible.242 In
proposing the adoption of the strict scrutiny test, I do mean strict
scrutiny. I emphatically do not mean a test that is merely “strict
in theory but feeble in fact.”243
One of the primary justifications driving the adoption of the
strict scrutiny test in this context is the fact that the students’
associational activities are occurring off campus, where the
university’s authority to regulate is already diminished, even for
school-sponsored associational activities.244
Additionally,
because these associational activities are not school sponsored, in
theory, there is no risk that the community at large will impute
the activities of the organizations to the university.245 There is
also the common sense justification that it does not make any
sense to grant universities broad authority to regulate their
students’ off-campus, non-school-sponsored associational
activities, because they have absolutely nothing to do with school.
Judicial deference to university authority in this context is
unwarranted and simply “becomes a matter of deference for
deference’s sake.”246

242. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014). The
strict scrutiny standard has an extensive history in First Amendment jurisprudence. See
generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800-01 (2006).
243. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013).
244. See supra Section II.B.1.
245. Indeed, even on campus, the Court has acknowledged that “an open forum in a
public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on [First Amendment
activities].” Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
246. LoMonte, supra note 13, at 341.
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Furthermore, although the right to intimate association
typically requires a balancing test,247 strict scrutiny is warranted
in this context because the university has no business whatsoever
regulating an off-campus, non-school-sponsored intimate
association. It would be nonsensical to assert that a university has
any say over how one of its students raises her children,248 who
she decides to marry,249 who she chooses to have sex with,250 or
any other of the kinds of relationships which have been
recognized as protected by the right to intimate association.251
Indeed, even if the more expansive Karstian definition of the right
is invoked, no one would seriously argue that a university has the
authority to regulate a student’s choice of who she decides to
become close friends with outside of school.252
Regarding the right to expressive association, strict scrutiny
is the test that is applied to the community at large.253 Therefore,
there is no reason why university students should have less
expressive associational rights off campus, while in the
community at large, when their associational activities are not
school sponsored. Ultimately, because the university should only
be permitted to regulate the off-campus, non-school-sponsored
associational activities of their students in the gravest of
circumstances, strict scrutiny is the best test for this final tier.
IV. COVID-19 AND THE THREE-TIERED
FRAMEWORK
Having now described and justified the three-tiered, sliding
scale of judicial scrutiny approach to university associational
247. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
248. See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (“[T]he child
of man is his parent’s child and not the State’s.”).
249. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“[T]he freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by
the State.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).
250. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“It suffices for us to
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter [into sexual] relationship[s] in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”).
251. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
252. Karst, supra note 21, at 629 (claiming that even “close friendship” may be
included in the right to intimate association).
253. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
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rights, I will apply it to the University of Arkansas’s COVID-19
disciplinary policy.254 The policy provides that, first, “on-campus
events are suspended, other than official events conducted by
University academic and administrative units, which are still
subject to approval on a case by case basis.”255 Second,
if the Office of Student Standards and Conduct receives a
report of large parties and similar social gatherings involving
10 or more student guests, without very clearly maintained
safety elements such as social distancing and mask-wearing,
and the report is verified, the University will treat the event
as a violation of the Code of Student Life by organizers and
by attendees. Organizing and conducting such an event will
be considered a serious matter and students will be held
accountable.256

Third, it provides that “if the Office of Student Standards and
Conduct receives a report of students in the Dickson Street
entertainment district or elsewhere congregating in large groups
to socialize, not maintaining social distancing and mask-wearing,
the matter will be treated as a Code of Student Life violation.”257
A. Tier 1: Rational Basis
The first part of the University policy, stating that “oncampus events are suspended, other than official events
conducted by University academic and administrative units,
which are still subject to approval on a case by case basis,”258
implicates the first tier of the three-tiered approach. Under the
first tier of the proposed framework, university regulation of oncampus, school-sponsored associational activity must be
reviewed under the rational basis test. The rational basis test
254. To view a copy of the actual policy, see Appendix A provided below. I apply my
approach to the University of Arkansas’s policy only because I attend law school there, not
because of any animus toward the school. Furthermore, the University of Arkansas’s policy
is a representative sample of many public universities’ COVID-19 policies nationwide. See
supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Thus, the application of my approach to the
University of Arkansas’s COVID-19 policy is applicable across the country. Do note that
the University’s policy has since changed.
255. Appendix A, supra note 8.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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requires that the university regulations be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.259 Rational basis is the lowest
standard of judicial review, and almost any regulation will pass
constitutional muster under this test.260 Indeed, the Court has held
that under rational basis review, it is “entirely irrelevant” what
end the government is actually seeking and regulations can be
based on “rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data.”261
One of the primary functions of government is to protect the
safety and well-being of its citizens.262 In furtherance of this
paramount objective, the Court has held that the states have an
interest in regulating the spread of infectious and contagious
diseases.263 Indeed, from the very beginning, the Court has
adhered to the principle that states have legitimate interests in
promulgating “quarantine laws [and] health laws of every
description . . . .”264 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court
stated that, “of paramount necessity, a community has the right to
protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the
safety of its members.”265 Recently, the Court confirmed that
preventing the spread of COVID-19 is not only a legitimate state
interest, but also a compelling one.266 Thus, here, one cannot
seriously argue that the University does not have a legitimate
interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19.
In terms of the second prong of the rational basis test, the
University’s policy of restricting on-campus, school-sponsored
259. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
260. See Sproule, supra note 213, at 809.
261. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
262. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan
v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
263. See generally Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of
Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387-88 (1902); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12-13, 39
(1905) (holding that Massachusetts had the authority to require its citizens to receive
smallpox vaccinations to prevent the spread of the disease).
264. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 205 (1824).
265. 197 U.S. at 27.
266. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020); S. Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614 (2020) (Kagan, J., in
chambers) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that “California undoubtedly has a
compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health of its
citizens.”).
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events to only those which have been officially sanctioned is
almost certainly rationally related to preventing the spread of
COVID-19. First, empirical evidence is not even necessary, as
the University “has the right to pass [regulations] which,
according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to
prevent the spread of contagious diseases.”267 Indeed, it is
common sense that preventing large groups of people from
congregating in close spaces helps prevent the spread of
communicable diseases. Beyond the common sense justification,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) COVID19 guidelines emphasize that large gatherings result in the rapid
transmission of COVID-19.268 Thus, the restriction of oncampus, school-sponsored events to only those which the
University has officially sanctioned is unquestionably a
“reasonable campus rule[]”269 that meets the rational basis test in
light of the University’s interest in preventing the spread of
COVID-19. Further, the policy applies to all on-campus, schoolsponsored events,270 meaning that it is content neutral and cannot
be struck down on the basis of viewpoint discrimination.
B. Tier 2: Intermediate Scrutiny
The second part of the University policy states:
if the Office of Student Standards and Conduct receives a
report of large parties and similar social gatherings involving
10 or more student guests, without very clearly maintained
safety elements such as social distancing and mask-wearing,
and the report is verified, the University will treat the event
as a violation of the Code of Student Life by organizers and
by attendees. Organizing and conducting such an event will
be considered a serious matter and students will be held
accountable.271

267. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.
268. Guidance for Organizing Large Events and Gatherings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, [https://perma.cc/QYE4-VBE3] (Mar. 8, 2021).
269. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972).
270. Appendix A, supra note 8.
271. Id.
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This implicates both prongs of the second tier. Under the second
tier of the proposed framework, university regulation of (1) offcampus, school-sponsored or (2) on-campus, non-schoolsponsored associational activity must be reviewed under the
intermediate scrutiny test. The intermediate scrutiny test requires
that the university’s regulation furthers an important state interest,
and does so by means that are substantially related to that
interest.272 There is no single definition of what constitutes an
important state interest, though the Court has provided a
multitude of examples.273 A substantial relation requires only that
the regulation be an effective way to achieve the stated objective,
not necessarily the optimal way, and that it ultimately “avoid
unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights.274
1. Off-Campus, School-Sponsored
The University policy targets “large parties and similar
social gatherings involving 10 or more student guests,” regardless
of whether they occur on or off campus.275 In the university
environment, off-campus social gatherings and large parties
involving ten or more students often occur at fraternity houses.
Universities consider fraternities as RSOs, requiring them to go
through various official recognition processes, and universities
retain the authority to regulate the organizations’ conduct, revoke
official recognition, and even ban the organizations from
272. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
273. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984)
(upholding a ban on sleeping in public parks against a First Amendment challenge because
the government had a “substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital
in an attractive and intact condition”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 380 (1968)
(upholding criminal sanction for destruction of Selective Service cards against a First
Amendment challenge because the government had an important interest in “preventing their
wanton and unrestrained destruction and assuring their continuing availability by punishing
people who knowingly and willfully destroy or mutilate them”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-63 (1994) (finding that “(1) preserving the benefits of free, overthe-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information
from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television
programming” are all important governmental interests); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737
(2008) (identifying “preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption” as an important
governmental interest).
274. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 199 (2014).
275. Appendix A, supra note 8.
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returning to campus.276 Thus, fraternities are school sponsored.
However, in addition to fraternities, the University of Arkansas’s
policy implicates any off-campus RSO meeting at which more
than ten people are in attendance, regardless of the purpose of the
meeting.277
Given the analysis of the State’s interest in preventing the
spread of communicable diseases above,278 the University’s
policy regulating off-campus, school-sponsored gatherings
certainly serves an important interest. Moreover, the policy is
likely substantially related to the State’s interest in preventing the
spread of COVID-19. The policy does not outright restrict
associational conduct, but rather, it simply requires students
organizing in groups of more than ten to follow nationally
mandated and empirically tested CDC COVID-19 best practice
guidelines.279 Thus, the University policy serves the important
state interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19 while also
“avoid[ing] unnecessary abridgment” of students’ First
Amendment rights in participating in off-campus, schoolsponsored activities.280
2. On-Campus, Non-School-Sponsored
As stated in the previous section, the University’s policy
targets “large parties and similar social gatherings involving 10
or more student guests,” regardless of whether they occur on or
off campus.281 Given the analysis of the State’s interest in
276. See generally, e.g., INTERFRATERNITY COUNCIL, COLL. OF WM. & MARY, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERFRATERNITY COUNCIL AT WILLIAM & MARY (2020),
[https://perma.cc/7AM6-Z29B]; UNIV. OF ARK. INTERFRATERNITY COUNCIL, UNIVERSITY
OF ARKANSAS INTERFRATERNITY COUNCIL CONSTITUTION (2019), [https://perma.cc/P65HW4SS]; Chapter Conduct Status, STOCKTON UNIV., [https://perma.cc/8WNW-6QEZ] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2021); UNIV. OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, THE ALL-GREEK SOCIAL CODE
(2009), [https://perma.cc/9H94-VRAZ]; Policies and Resources for Members, NYU,
[https://perma.cc/6AEG-RQ6H] (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).
277. Appendix A, supra note 8.
278. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
279. Appendix A, supra note 8; How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, [https://perma.cc/K5J9-LCMQ] (Mar. 8, 2021) (advocating
social distancing, mask wearing, avoiding large gatherings, among other things).
280. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 199 (2014).
281. Appendix A, supra note 8.
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preventing the spread of communicable diseases above,282 the
University’s policy regulating on-campus, non-school-sponsored
gatherings surely serves an important interest. This is especially
true in the on-campus context because university campuses are
“at risk to develop an extreme incidence of COVID-19 and
become superspreaders for neighboring communities.”283
Moreover, it is almost certain that the policy is substantially
related to the achievement of the State’s interest in preventing the
spread of COVID-19. First, the CDC emphasized that, “measures
are needed to reduce transmission at institutes of higher education
and could include reducing on-campus housing density, ensuring
adherence to masking and other mitigation strategies, increasing
testing for SARS-CoV-2, and discouraging student
gatherings.”284 The policy seeks to implement many of these
recommendations as it encourages students to avoid large
gatherings, wear masks, and practice social distancing
techniques.285 Empirical data suggests that these kinds of actions
on the part of university administrators are effectual in stemming
the spread of COVID-19.286 Furthermore, the policy says nothing
about gatherings of less than ten people, essentially respecting
students’ intimate association rights. Finally, as discussed in the
prior section, the policy does not outright ban large gatherings,
but rather, it simply requires students organizing in groups of
more than ten to follow nationally mandated and empirically
tested CDC COVID-19 best practice guidelines.287 Thus, the
University policy serves the important state interest of preventing
the spread of COVID-19 while also “avoid[ing] unnecessary
282. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
283. Hannah Lu et al., Are College Campuses Superspreaders? A Data-Driven
Modeling Study, 24 COMPUT. METHODS IN BIOMECHANICS & BIOMEDICAL ENG’G 1136,
1136 (2021), [https://perma.cc/U3MZ-5TGS]; see also Erica Wilson et al., Multiple COVID19 Clusters on a University Campus—North Carolina, August 2020, in 69 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 1416, 1416 (2020),
[https://perma.cc/92TF-UBBN]; Danielle Ivory et al., Young People Have Less COVID-19
Risk, but in College Towns, Deaths Rose Fast, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/7FZH-CVFR]
(Mar. 2, 2021) (finding that “deaths in communities that are home to colleges have risen
faster than the rest of the nation”).
284. Wilson et al., supra note 283, at 1418.
285. Appendix A, supra note 8.
286. See, e.g., Wilson et al., supra note 283, at 1413; Lu et al., supra note 283, at 1144.
287. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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abridgment” of its students’ First Amendment rights while on
campus participating in non-school-sponsored activities.288
C. Tier 3: Strict Scrutiny
Finally, the last part of the University policy provides that
“if the Office of Student Standards and Conduct receives a report
of students in the Dickson Street entertainment district or
elsewhere congregating in large groups to socialize, not
maintaining social distancing and mask-wearing, the matter will
be treated as a Code of Student Life violation.”289 This aspect of
the policy implicates the third tier of the three-tiered approach, as
it restricts off-campus, non-school-sponsored associational
activities. Under this final tier, university regulation of offcampus, non-school-sponsored associational activities is subject
to the most rigorous standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny.
The strict scrutiny test requires the university to affirmatively
demonstrate that the regulation “furthers a compelling interest
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,” meaning that the
regulation employs the least restrictive means possible.290
Although there is no single definition of what constitutes a
compelling state interest, the Court has provided a multitude of
examples.291 Indeed, beyond that, it has explicitly held that
“[s]temming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a

288. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 199 (2014).
289. Appendix A, supra note 8.
290. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).
291. Compare Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (finding that
states have a compelling interest “in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1984) (holding that states have
a compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (same); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 702 (2007) (finding that “remedying the effects of
past intentional discrimination is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test”); Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 308 (2013) (reiterating that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 572 (1995) (discussing the state’s interest in eliminating discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation), with Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015) (suggesting
that neither preserving a town’s aesthetic appeal nor traffic safety were compelling state
interests).
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compelling interest . . . .”292 Thus, the compelling state interest
prong of the strict scrutiny test is certainly met here.
The narrowly tailored prong is a closer question. On the one
hand, the “Constitution principally entrusts” state officials with
broad latitude to guard and protect health and safety when there
are medical and scientific uncertainties and “[w]here those broad
limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to secondguessing by [the courts] which lack[] the background,
competence, and expertise to assess public health and [are] not
accountable to the people.”293 However, on the other hand, “even
in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and
forgotten.”294 Thus, although the University has implemented the
policy in the face of an unprecedented crisis, caution is still
warranted. As aptly stated by Judge Stickman of the Western
District of Pennsylvania in discussing COVID-19 regulations:
[G]ood intentions toward a laudable end are not alone
enough to uphold governmental action against a
constitutional challenge. Indeed, the greatest threats to our
system of constitutional liberties may arise when the ends
are laudable, and the intent is good—especially in a time of
emergency. In an emergency, even a vigilant public may let
down its guard over its constitutional liberties only to find
that liberties, once relinquished, are hard to recoup and that
restrictions—while expedient in the face of an emergency
situation—may persist long after immediate danger has
passed. Thus, in reviewing emergency measures, the job of
courts is made more difficult by the delicate balancing that
they must undertake. The Court is guided in this balancing
by principles of established constitutional jurisprudence.295

The Court held in Frisby v. Schultz that “[a] [regulation] is
narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the

292. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (emphasis
added); see also S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614 (2020)
(Kagan, J., in chambers) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that “California undoubtedly
has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health of
its citizens.”).
293. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613-14 (Kagan, J., in chambers)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
294. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 68.
295. Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 883, 890 (W.D. Pa. 2020).
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exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”296 Here, on the one
hand, the University policy does not define what constitutes a
“large group[]” and it applies broadly to cover any student
gathering, whether it be on public or private property, and without
regard to its proximity to the University.297 However, on the other
hand, it only covers “socializ[ing],” indicating that many
protected associational activities, such as protesting, are not even
implicated.298 Importantly, as discussed in the prior section, the
policy does not outright ban large gatherings, but rather, it simply
requires students to follow nationally mandated and empirically
tested CDC COVID-19 best practice guidelines.299 Thus, the
University policy serves the compelling state interest in stemming
the spread of COVID-19 while also “eliminat[ing] no more than
the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”300 Ultimately,
then, the University policy is likely constitutional even under the
strict scrutiny test.
V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented the United States
with unprecedented challenges. Uncertainty abounds, and in the
face of that uncertainty, federal, state, and local government
actors have done the best they can to keep American citizens safe.
Desperate times often call for desperate measures. Importantly,
however, desperate times do not condone draconian measures.
Indeed, “even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away
and forgotten.”301
As government officials have taken
unprecedented actions in attempting to stem the spread of
COVID-19, many have raised novel constitutional questions, or
highlighted areas of constitutional law that are severely
296. 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984)).
297. Appendix A, supra note 8.
298. Id. Indeed, as Judge Van Tatenhove of the Eastern District of Kentucky recently
opined, “it is the right to protest . . . that is constitutionally protected, not the right to dine
out, work in an office setting, or attend an auction.” Ramsek v. Beshear, 468 F. Supp. 3d
904, 919 (E.D. Ky. 2020). However, the right to intimate association is still implicated.
299. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
300. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808).
301. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020).
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underdeveloped and in desperate need of a new approach. The
university student associational rights jurisprudence is
paradigmatic.
COVID-19 has presented the Court with the perfect
opportunity to remedy the incoherent and unworkable state of
university student associational rights jurisprudence. My threetiered, sliding scale of judicial scrutiny approach provides the
Court with a sound, precedent-based test that adequately weighs
both student associational rights and the prerogatives of
university administrators “in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment,”302 both on and off campus. It utilizes
familiar standards and is easy to apply. Perhaps it is time an
addition was made to Justice Fortas’s oft-quoted line in Tinker,
“[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech [or association] at
the schoolhouse gate,” or beyond it.303

302. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
303. Id.; see supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A

